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Abstract: Invest in India is an initiative to market India as an investment destination all over the globe, to 
provide a networking platform to the Indian businesses at a global level and to provide information to the 
international investors about investment opportunities in India. It is the policy of the Government of India 
to attract and promote productive Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from non-residents in activities which 
significantly contribute to industrialization and socio-economic development. FDI supplements the 
domestic capital and technology. This paper firstly speaks about the FDI culture in India, secondly, 
reviews economic reforms in India and global response to India’s reforms, the next level discusses the 
policy issues that would address India’s relative lack of success in attracting FDI and the ‘Expanding 
Opportunities for Global Retailers’ with reference to the retail sector. The last part reveals the key 
recommendations towards attracting Diaspora FDI. Based on the objective analysis, the key 
recommendations towards attracting FDI are revealed like allow 100 % FDI in retail and Small & Medium 
Enterprises (SME), develop a strategic vision for FDI with focus on latest technology, reduce the 
transaction costs & improve the infrastructure, international and domestic entrepreneurship, 
decentralize the administration process, reduce overly bureaucratic FDI facilities, private public 
partnership with private sector taking the lead, Indian professionals placed in key decision making 
positions, creative joint ventures and partnership to tap entrepreneurship and fix the policies to convert 
remittances into investment & create venture capital.  
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1. Introduction 
 
‘FDI’ means investment by non-resident entity/person resident outside India in the capital of the Indian 
company under Schedule 1 of FEM (Transfer or Issue of Security by a Person Resident outside India) 
Regulations 2000 (Government of India, 2010). FDI flows will remain disappointing through 2011, 
according to the 2010 A.T. Kearney Foreign Direct Investment Confidence Index, a regular assessment of 
senior executive sentiment at the world’s largest companies. The Index also found executives are wary of 
making investments in the current economic climate and revealed that they expect the economic 
turnaround to happen not earlier than 2011. Half of the companies surveyed also report that they are 
postponing investments as a result of market uncertainty and difficulties in obtaining credit. 
 
China remains the top-ranked destination by foreign investors, a title it has held since 2002. The United 
States retakes second place from India, which had surpassed it in 2005. India, Brazil and Germany 
complete the top five favored investment destinations. Overall, developed economies rose in the Index as 
investors looked for safety. The most striking exception is the United Kingdom, whose reliance on 
financial services left it exposed in the current crisis. At the same time, the placement of China, India and 
Brazil in the top five shows a strong vote of confidence for the strength of these economies. Investors also 
expressed the most optimism about the future outlook for China, India and Brazil.  
 
The volume of FDI in India is relatively low comparing to China. This relatively low volume of FDI, 
especially in comparison with China, has attracted widespread comment and sweeping policy 
recommendations for increasing the volume of FDI in the country. If China, with its newfound faith in 
capitalism, can embrace and attract substantial volumes of FDI, why can’t India, which is blessed with 
western institutions and capitalist organizations? This impassioned advocacy of increased flows of FDI 
into India is based on the well worn arguments that FDI is a rich source of technology and know how and 
capital to boot, it can invigorate the labor intensive export oriented industries of India, promote 
technological change in the science based industries and put India on a growth path on par with China. 
This exuberance for FDI is an article of faith, India is asked to accept it as such, it is not based on an 
analytical review of India's needs and requirements and it’s potential for attracting large rows of FDI. The 
case for attracting large volumes of FDI into India requires an analysis of FDI culture, economic reforms & 
139 
 
policy issues in the Indian context. This is the purpose of this paper which is based on the vast literature 
on FDI in general and FDI in India in particular. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 1: 2010 FDI Confidence Index 
Source: A T Kearney analysis 2010 - Foreign Direct Investment Confidence Index 
 
The main objectives of this research paper have five dimensions: 
1. Understand the FDI culture in India 
2. Review the economic reforms in India and global response to India’s reforms 
3. Discussion on the policy issues that would address India’s relative lack of success in attracting 
FDI 
4. Reveals the ‘Expanding Opportunities for Global Retailers’ with reference to the retail sector 
5. Key Recommendations towards Attracting Diaspora FDI  
 
2. Review of Literature 
 
Is India capable of attracting much larger volumes of FDI than it does at present? Should India throw all 
doors wide open to FDI as advocated by the Harvard economists? Is China's experience a role model for 
India? The literature on FDI has some light on these issues. Why do firms go abroad? Why do they choose 
to invest in specific locations? The origins of the theoretical literature on determinants of FDI are to be 
found in Hymer’s (1976) doctoral dissertation. His thesis briefly put is that firms go abroad to exploit the 
rents inherent in the monopoly over advantages they possess and FDI is their preferred mode of 
operations. The advantages firms possess include patented technology, team specific managerial skills, 
marketing skills and brand names. All other methods of exploiting these advantages in external markets 
such as licensing agreements and exports are inferior to FDI because the market for knowledge or 
advantages possessed by firms tends to be imperfect. In other words, they do not permit firms to exercise 
control over operations essential for retaining and fully exploiting the advantages they own. 
 
 Hymer's insights form the basis for other explanations such as the transactions costs and internalization 
theories (Buckley and Casson, 1991), most of which in essence argue that firms internalize operations, 
forge backward and forward linkages in order to by-pass the market with all its imperfections. Dunning 
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(1973) neatly synthesizes these and other explanations in the well-known eclectic paradigm or the OLI 
explanation of FDI. For a firm to successfully invest abroad it must possess advantages which no other 
firm possess (O), the country it waits to invest in should offer location advantages (L), and it must be 
capable of internalizing operations (I). Internalization is synonymous with the ability of firms to exercise 
control over operations. And such control is essential for the exploitation of the advantages which firms 
possess and the location advantages which host countries offer. 
 
It is the location advantages emphasized by Dunning, which forms the core of much of the discussion on 
the determinants of FDI in developing countries. The two other attributes necessary for FDI are taken as 
given from the perspective of developing countries. Dunning (1973) set the ball rolling on econometric 
studies with a statistical analysis of survey evidence on the determinants of FDI. His study identified three 
main determinants of FDI in a particular location; market forces (including market size and growth, as 
determined by the national income of the recipient country), cost factors (such as labour cost and 
availability and the domestic inflation situation) and the investment climate (as determined by such 
considerations as the extent of foreign indebtedness and the state of the balance of payments). Dunning’s 
(1973, 1993) analysis proved influential and were pursued further by others (Agarwal, 1980, Agarwal, 
2000, Root and Ahmed, 1979, Levis, 1979, Balasubramanyam and Salisu, 1991, Balasubramanyam, Salisu 
and Sapsford, 1999). Although the empirical literature continues to grow unabated both in size and 
econometric sophistication, its overall message can be briefly summarised in the form of the following 
propositions. 
 
1. Host countries with sizeable domestic markets, measured by GDP per capita and sustained 
growth of these markets, measured by growth rates of GDP, attract relatively large volumes of 
FDI. 
2. Resource endowments of host countries including natural resources and human resources are a 
factor of importance in the investment decision process of foreign firms. 
3. Infrastructure facilities including transportation and communication networks are an important 
determinant of FDI. 
4. Macroeconomic stability, signified by stable exchange rates and low rates of inflation is a 
significant factor in attracting foreign investors. Political stability in the host countries is an 
important factor in the investment decision process of foreign firms. 
5. A stable and transparent policy framework towards FDI is attractive to potential investors. 
6. Foreign firms place a premium on a distortion free economic and business environment. An 
allied proposition here is that a distortion free foreign trade regime, which is neutral in terms of 
the incentives it provides for import substituting (IS) and export industries (EP), attracts 
relatively large volumes of FDI than either an IS or an EP regime. 
7. Fiscal and monetary incentives in the form of tax concessions do play a role in attracting FDI, but 
these are of little significance in the absence of a stable economic environment. 
 
How does India fare on these attributes? It does possess a large domestic market, it has achieved growth 
rates of around 5 to 6 percent per annum in recent years, its overall record on macroeconomic stability, 
save for the crisis years of the late eighties, is superior to that of most other developing countries. And 
judged by the criterion of the stability of policies it has displayed a relatively high degree of political 
stability. It is, however, India’s trade and FDI regimes which are seen as major impediments to increased 
inflows of FDI. The product and factor market distortions generated by the inward looking import 
substitution industrial policies India pursued until recently have been widely discussed. So it’s too 
complex and cumbersome FDI regime in place until the nineties. 
 
3. Research Methodology  
 
A descriptive research design suits to achieve the five dimension objectives. Data are collected through 
secondary sources like research reports and websites.  Secondary data, which is published by RBI, is 
referred here. Primary data cannot be taken because it is a country wise report analysis. The literature 
survey is done for the past six months about the FDI Scenario in India. Based on the analysis, the research 
paper is written. The limitation of this research paper is, there are many aspects which determine the FDI 
scenario in India, but very few aspects are discussed here. This limitation will be overcome in the future 
research. 
 
 
141 
 
4. FDI Culture in India 
 
Many economists in the country have now realized the advantages of FDI to India. While the 
achievements of the Indian government are to be lauded, a willingness to attract FDI has resulted in what 
could be termed an “FDI Industry”. While researching the economic reforms on FDI, it was discovered 
that there exists a plethora of boards, committees, and agencies that have been constituted to ease the 
flow of FDI. A call to one agency about their mandate and scope usually results in the quintessential 
response to call someone else. Reports from FICCI and the Planning Commission place investor 
confidence and satisfaction at an all time high; citizens too deserve to be clued in on the government 
bodies are doing. According to the current policy FDI can come into India in two ways. Firstly FDI up to 
100% is allowed under the automatic route in all activities/sectors except a small list that require 
approval of the Government. FDI in sectors/activities under automatic route does not require any prior 
approval either by the Government or RBI. The investors are required to notify the Regional office 
concerned of RBI within 30 days of receipt of inward remittances and file the required documents with 
that office within 30 days of issue of shares to foreign investors. All proposals for foreign investment 
requiring Government approval are considered by the Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB). The 
FIPB also grants composite approvals involving foreign investment/foreign technical collaboration.  
 
The face of FDI usually resides with pamphlets and amalgamation of facts and figures that are circulated 
through many conferences. From these it can be deciphered that officially FDI policy is reviewed on an 
ongoing basis and measures for its further liberalization are taken. The change in sectoral policy/ sectoral 
equity cap is notified from time to time through Press Notes by the Secretariat for Industrial Assistance 
(SIA) in the Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion. Policy announcement by SIA are subsequently 
notified by Reserve Bank of India (RBI) under Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA). Thus while 
clear procedures have been established for FDI, government needs to seriously evaluate how much 
resources and money is being poured to what is becoming the FDI industry. The fluidity of bodies has 
resulted in the monetary value of FDI feeding a makeshift industry that deals with dealing with the 
concept and procedures of FDI. 
 
Doing Business in India – World Bank 
 
The World Bank conducts an annual study on “Doing Business in India” (World Bank 2007). The next 
report available in Doing Business 2008 and in this report, India is ranked a rather inglorious 120 out of 
178 economies. The report is based on a “series of annual reports investigating the regulations that 
enhance business activity and those that constrain it. Doing Business presents quantitative indicators on 
business regulations and the protection of property rights that can be compared across 178 economies 
from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe and over time. The report considers 10 indicators and they are fairly self-
explanatory. These indicators are; starting a business, dealing with licenses, employing workers, 
registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing 
contracts and closing a business. 
 
Table 1: Doing Business in India 
 Rank 
            Easy of Doing Business  120 
1  Starting a Business  111 
2  Dealing with Licenses  134 
3  Employing Workers  85 
4  Registering Property  112 
5  Getting Credit  36 
6  Protecting Investors  33 
7  Paying Taxes  165 
8  Trading Across Borders  79 
9  Enforcing Contracts  177 
10  Closing a Business  137 
Source: Doing Business: World Bank 
 
India fairs “decently” in only two areas, viz. getting credit and protecting investors’ categories. Perhaps 
the truly embarrassing rank is for the “enforcing contracts” category in which India is ranked a dismal 
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177 out of 178 countries. According to the report, it takes 1420 days to enforce a contract and the cost to 
enforce that contract is almost two-fifths of the claim. This is a key concern for businesses. 
 
Table 2: FDI Equity Inflows (Month-Wise) During the Calendar Year 2010 
Source: RBI’S bulletin January 2011 Dt. 12.01 .2011 (foreign investment inflows). 
 
Table 2 clearly shows the month wise FDI Equity inflows during the calendar year 2010. The % of FDI 
inflows come down by 30% comparing to 2009.  
 
Table 3: Share of Top Investing Countries FDI Equity Inflows (Financial years) Amount ` in Crores 
(US$ in million) 
Ranks Country 2008-09 
(Apr-Mar) 
2009-10 
(Apr-Mar) 
2010-11 
(Apr-Nov) 
Cumulative 
Inflows 
(Apr ’00-Nov ‘10) 
%age to total 
Inflows 
1. Mauritius  50,899  
(11,229)  
49,633  
(10,376)  
23,576  
(5,158)  
234,482  
(52,398)  
42 %  
2. Singapore  15,727  
(3,454)  
11,295  
(2,379)  
6,198  
(1,367)  
51,344  
(11,557)  
9 %  
3. U.S.A.  8,002  
(1,802)  
9,230  
(1,943)  
4,247  
(926)  
41,436  
(9,204)  
7 %  
4. U.K.  3,840  
(864)  
3,094  
(657)  
1,765  
(385)  
27,764  
(6,269)  
5 %  
5. Netherland 3,922  
(883)  
4,283  
(899)  
3,643  
(802)  
23,769  
(5,289)  
4 %  
6. Japan  1,889  
(405)  
5,670  
(1,183)  
4,141  
(917)  
21,036  
(4,631)  
4 %  
7. Cyprus  5,983  
(1,287)  
7,728  
(1,627)  
2,746  
(598)  
20,523  
(4,498)  
4 %  
8. Germany  2,750  
(629)  
2,980  
(626)  
473  
(104)  
12,941  
(2,903)  
2 %  
9 France  2,098  
(467)  
1,437  
(303)  
1,569  
(340)  
8,488  
(1,870)  
2 %  
10. U.A.E.  1,133  
(257)  
3,017  
(629)  
1,289  
(278)  
8,312  
(1,828)  
1 %  
Total FDI Inflows  123,025 
(27,331)  
123,120 
(25,834)  
64,083 
(14,025)  
556,819 
(124,436)  
-  
 
Table 3 speaks about the share of top investing countries FDI equity inflows, in which Mauritius hold the 
highest of 42%. 
 
 
Calendar Year 2010 
(Jan.-Dec.) 
Amount of FDI inflows 
(In Crores) (In US$ mn) 
1. January 2010  9,386  2,042  
2. February 2010  7,955  1,717  
3 March 2010  5,497  1,209  
4. April 2010  9,697  2,179  
5. May 2010  10,135  2,213  
6. June 2010  6,429  1,380  
7. July 2010  8,359  1,785  
8. August 2010  6,196  1,330  
9. September 2010  9,754  2,118  
10 October 2010  6,185  1,392  
11. November 2010  7,328  1,628  
Year 2010 (up to November 2010)  86,921  18,993  
Year 2009 (up to November 2009)  123,795  25,504  
%age growth over last year  ( - ) 30 %  ( - ) 26 %  
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Table 4: Sectors Attracting Highest FDI Equity Inflows (Amount in Crores US$ in million) 
Ranks Sector 2008-09 
(Apr-Mar) 
2009-10 
(Apr-Mar) 
2010-11 
( Apr-Nov) 
Cumulative 
Inflows 
(Apr ’00 -Nov ‘10) 
% age 
to total 
Inflows 
1. Services Sector  
(financial & non-financial)  
28,516  
(6,138)  
20,776  
(4,353)  
11,885  
(2,596)  
117,114  
(26,197)  
21 %  
2. Computer Software & 
Hardware  
7,329  
(1,677)  
4,351  
(919)  
2,617  
(574)  
46,464  
(10,446)  
8 %  
3. Telecommunications  
(radio paging, cellular 
mobile, basic telephone 
services)  
11,727  
(2,558)  
12,338  
(2,554)  
4,962  
(1,093)  
45,668  
(10,023)  
8 %  
4. Housing & Real Estate  12,621  
(2,801)  
13,586  
(2,844)  
4,569  
(999)  
41,938  
(9,356)  
8 %  
5. Construction Activities  
(including roads & 
highways)  
8,792  
(2,028)  
13,516  
(2,862)  
3,762  
(834)  
39,455  
(8,887)  
7 %  
6. Power  4,382  
(985)  
6,908  
(1,437)  
4,491  
(984)  
25,411  
(5,611)  
5 %  
7. Automobile Industry  5,212  
(1,152)  
5,754  
(1,208)  
2,399  
(533)  
23,221  
(5,129)  
4 %  
8. Metallurgical Industries  4,157  
(961)  
1,935  
(407)  
4,402  
(960)  
17,842  
(4,090)  
3 %  
9. Petroleum & Natural Gas  1,931  
(412)  
1,328  
(272)  
2,421  
(529)  
13,925  
(3,195)  
3 %  
10. Chemicals  
(other than fertilizers)  
3,427  
(749)  
1,707  
(362)  
1,238  
(271)  
12,513  
(2,767)  
2 %  
 
Table 4 lists the sectors attracting highest FDI equity inflows, in which service sector holds the highest of 
21% and the list goes on. 
 
5. Economic Reforms in India 
 
Major economic reforms in India have been associated with crises. For example, after nearly two decades 
of industry-oriented planning, India accorded due importance to the agricultural sector in the late 1960s, 
in response to massive food shortages. The consequence of the policy shift was the Green Revolution in 
the early 1970s. The balance of payments crisis of the early 1980s, together with the stagnation that had 
become known as the “Hindu” rate of growth, precipitated the “new” economic policy of 1984-85, in 
which lay the genesis for the economic reforms of the 1990s. The reforms process in the 1980s was aimed 
mostly at opening up the economy to import competition, and at streamlining the process of tax 
administration. The much discussed economic reforms of the 1990s, the first sustained effort at 
restructuring the economy, came in response to another balance of payments crisis in 1991, when India 
was left with two weeks’ import cover. The government reacted by ushering in sweeping macroeconomic 
and structural changes. Direct tax rates were reduced for both individuals and corporate entities, with the 
expectation that reduced tax rates would lead to greater compliance. Tariff rates too were reduced, and 
the peak tariff rate came down from 350 percent in 1990-91 to 35 percent in 2000-01. The structure of 
the other indirect taxes was rationalized, and a process was put in place to enable the introduction of 
value added tax in the foreseeable future. 
 
Licensing was eliminated, and firms in all but a few sectors were allowed to start operations without 
government approval. The impact of de-licensing was most evident in sectors like steel, automobiles, 
FMCG and consumer electronics which witnessed a surge in entry of new firms. Over time, capital account 
restrictions were eased to allow Indian companies to raise capital abroad, by way of Eurobonds and 
GDR/ADRs, and acquire firms in other countries. The domestic capital market was restructured with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Stock Exchange as the driving forces, and interest 
rates were liberalized. In brief, market forces were unleashed both in the product and, by and large, in the 
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factor markets, and firms were given much more freedom to realize gains associated with allocation 
efficiency. 
 
The government also made is easier for MNCs to invest in India. Today, India welcomes foreign 
investment in virtually all sectors except defence, railway transport and atomic energy. In sectors like 
road and port infrastructure, mining of gold and minerals, and pharmaceuticals, MNCs can own up to 100 
percent of their Indian affiliates without government approval. In certain other lines of business like 
generation of power and development of integrated townships, 100 percent foreign ownership is possible 
with government approval. In activities like exploration for petroleum reserves, development of 
marketing infrastructure for petroleum products, and exploration and mining of coal, MNCs are allowed 
majority stake in the affiliate. Usually varying between 51 percent and 74 percent. In most cases, however, 
their stakes in SOEs are restricted to 26 percent. Finally, in sectors like media and insurance, MNCs are 
restricted to minority stake, and are expected to obtain government approval prior to initiation of 
business. 
 
All is not well with the business environment in India, however. Aside from continuing bureaucratization 
of many processes affecting business, the reforms process in India has three weak links. First, the policy 
of protecting small firms in some sectors has not completely been eliminated, thereby preventing entry of 
larger and more solvent firms, with greater economies of scale, to these sectors. This has had an adverse 
impact on the competitiveness of firms in these sectors. Second, privatization in India has largely been a 
tame affair; despite some major privatization deals involving companies like the aluminum giant BALCO, 
the (former) telecom monopoly VSNL and the country’s flagship (automobile) product Maruti Suzuki. 
Successive governments have failed to meet privatization targets and privatization of large and inefficient 
firms like Indian Airlines and Air India have repeatedly been postponed. Third, the labour code remains 
largely unchanged, and closure of bankrupt firms remains a difficult and tedious process.  
 
Global Response to India’s Reforms 
 
How has the rest of the world reacted to the width and depth of the Indian reforms? As measured by the 
quantum of FDI inflow, global response has been, by and large, positive. The annual flow of FDI rose from 
a paltry USD 0.1 billion in 1991 to USD 4.28 billion in 2001. FDI in 2001 accounted for 1 percent of GDP 
and 4.3 percent of domestic investment, the corresponding figures for 1991 being 0.07 and 0.12 
respectively. However, the aggregate stock of FDI received by India during the 1990s stands at a low USD 
18 billion, less than half of China’s annual flow of FDI. From the average policymaker’s perspective, more 
worrisome is the fact that an exponential growth in FDI inflow is not expected in the near future, despite 
the elimination of a large number of barriers to FDI during the last 10 years (Kathuria, 2000). 
 
In order to better understand the reason behind India’s sub-expectations performance, in so far as 
quantum of FDI is concerned, one has to probe at the sub- national level. Specifically, one has to 
understand the nature and ex post views of the MNCs investing India. Are they large MNCs, for example, 
who want to have a small exposure to India by way of a downstream affiliate or are they largely in sectors 
like financial services where there is a lot of scope for transfer of technology and knowhow but little 
scope for significant transfer of capital? Are the spillover effects of entry, by way of technology transfer, 
training of personnel and export growth, significant such that the inflow of relatively small quantum of 
capital is supplemented by significant intangible gains? Are they entering largely by way of Joint Ventures 
where the investment is split between MNCs and local firms, thereby reducing the MNCs contribution to 
capital? Given the possible relationship between entry mode choice and the aforementioned intangibles, 
what determines the choice of the entry mode? Are MNCs that are in operation in India meeting their 
expectation about performance, thereby signaling to others that investment in India is worthwhile? 
 
6. Discussion on the policy issues that would address India’s relative lack of success in attracting 
FDI 
 
Dynamics of FDI in India and China 
 
The strength of the Chinese Diaspora in managing transnational export businesses based on low cost, 
small scale manufacturing is further strengthened through a very strong network of ethnic Chinese 
businesses across the world. This network helps the Diaspora entrepreneurial community to reduce the 
transaction cost of managing trade across borders even without the kind of capital and marketing 
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networks of their larger MNC competitors. As Kao points out, 39% of business relations of Chinese firms 
in SE Asia were with other Chinese firms. The Indian Diaspora lacks such business networks, which is not 
surprising, given that a very large proportion of Indian diaspora are not directly engaged in 
manufacturing, but is either professionals or engaged in services oriented businesses. However, the 
Indian diaspora has been successful in certain niche export-oriented global trading networks, a good 
example being the diamond cutting and retailing network managed by Indian entrepreneurs based in 
South Africa, Surat (in Gujarat), Amsterdam and New York. An interesting point that needs to be made 
here is that the development of Surat as a global centre of diamond cutting industry and the emergence of 
a competitive diamond trading community of Indians across the world did not require SEZs or special 
government policies. It happened because the right conditions, i.e. skilled entrepreneurs, feasible low cost 
and small scale manufacturing base (Surat) and existence of transnational business connections 
strengthened by Diaspora links developed over the years. The importance of being a low cost 
manufacturing base and having extensive international trade ties is very significant. 
 
According to Wei (2005), China’s emergence as a low cost manufacturing base and sustained export 
growth through much of the 1980’s and 1990’s is an important reason behind its relative success in 
attracting FDI, not just of the Diaspora variety, but in general. Investors from OECD economies will invest 
in an economy if they see plausible long-term gains. Such gains will arise out of either domestic 
opportunities in that economy or its ability to be a competitive base for third country exports. India has 
lagged far behind China in terms of Trade Facilitation and export sector promotion in manufacturing and 
agriculture, and it is only in recent times that FDI geared towards third country markets has been coming 
into India.  A good example is the automotive parts industry where India has recently emerged as a very 
competitive player and FDI into this sector has taken off. Given India’s large domestic market 
opportunities, FDI in several other sectors is bound to take off in the coming years. The important point is 
that policies and investment facilitation are part of larger set of factors that influence FDI; they cannot 
substitute hard economic considerations. Unless India reduces the transaction costs in manufacturing and 
agriculture, undertakes radical reforms in trade facilitation and export promotion to become an 
international production hub, and addresses key infrastructure issues such as energy and transportation 
costs, FDI, whether Diaspora or MNC variety, will not reach India.  
 
A good example that supports this argument of FDI dynamics influenced by global market opportunities 
coupled with Diaspora expertise and networks is the IT and ITES sector in India. India’s professional IT 
and management oriented diaspora realized the cost arbitration offered by off shoring IT and ITES work 
to India. Given the Diaspora expertise in this sector and the strong linkages amongst the Diaspora 
community in the Silicon Valley, it did not take long before several startups took place in Bangalore and 
Hyderabad followed by rest of India. An important point that needs to be made here is that the diaspora 
had a role as an entrepreneur as well as arbitrators of MNC investment into India in this sector where 
Indian manager-professionals engaged with MNCs took the lead in bringing significant investment into 
India. Just like the Chinese diaspora’s global networks helped small entrepreneurs to tap the global 
market successfully, the Indian Diaspora network in IT and ITES helped small Indian start-ups (with seed 
capital of less 3-4 million USD) succeed globally. The transaction costs of exporting services where 
relatively low in India compared to manufacturing, it did not have to depend on India’s poor quality of 
roads, logistics shipping infrastructure. Proactive policies in the IT sector initiated in the mid 1980’s also 
helped. Thus, given the right conditions, the Indian diaspora will be second to none in seeking economic 
opportunities in their countries of origin and contribute to its economic growth. 
 
FDI Requirement 
 
The requirement for FDI arises out of three basic rationale; first, to meet the gap between required 
investments to funnel economic growth and national savings, second, to get strategic technology transfer 
and managerial expertise, and third, to add to the competitive edge for exports given the international 
linkages arising out of FDI. 
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Table 5: Financial Year-Wise FDI Inflows Data as per International Best Practices (Amount 
US$ million) 
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%age 
growth 
over 
previous 
year  
Financial Years 2000-2011  
1 2000-01 2,339 61 1,350 279 4,029  -  1,847  
2 2001-02 3,904  191  1,645  390 6,130  (+) 52 %  1,505  
3 2002-03 2,574  190  1,833  438 5,035  (-) 18 %  377  
4 2003-04 2,197  1,460  1,460  633 4,322  (-) 14 %  10,918  
5 2004-05 3,250  1,904  1,904  369 6,051  (+) 40 %  8,686  
6 2005-06 5,540  2,760  2,760  226 8,961  (+) 48 %  9,926  
7 2006-07 15,585  5,828  5,828  517 22,826  (+) 146 %  3,225  
8 2007-08 24,573  7,679  7,679  292 34,835  (+) 53 %  20,328  
9 2008-09 27,329  9,030  9,030  777 37,838  (+) 09 %  (-) 15,017  
10 2009-10 
(P) 
(+)(++) 
25,609  8,669  8,669  1,945 37,763  (-) 0.2 % 29,048  
 
11 (up to 
Novembe
r 2010) 
14,025  4,237  4,237  303 19,002  
 
- 31,007  
 
Cumulative 
Total  
(from April 
2000 to 
November 
2010) 
126,925  7,303  46,395  6,169 186,792 - 101,850 
Source:  RBI’s Bulletin January 2011 dt. 12.01 .2011 (Foreign Investment Inflows) 
 
Table 5 shows FDI inflows as per international best practices in which investments by Foreign 
Institutional Investors are growing positive in 2010. 
 
7. Expanding Opportunities for Global Retailers’ with reference to the retail sector 
 
1. Carrefour, the world’s second-largest retailer, has opened its first cash-and-carry store in India in 
New Delhi. Germany-based wholesale company Metro Cash & Carry (MCC) opened its second 
wholesale centre at Uppal in Hyderabad, taking to its number to six in the country.  
2. Electronic retail chain major, Next Retail India, plans to open 400 showrooms across the country 
during January-March 2011 increasing the total number of retail stores to 1,000 by the end of the 
fiscal year 2010-11.  
3. Jewellery retail store chain Tanishq plans to open 15 new retail stores in various parts of the 
country in the 2011-12 fiscal.  
4. V Mart Retail Ltd, a medium-sized hypermarket format retail chain, is set to open 40 outlets over 
the next three years, starting with 13 stores in 2011, in Tier-II and Tier-III cities.  
5. Reliance Retail, the wholly owned subsidiary of Mukesh Ambani's Reliance Industries, is set to 
open 150 stores by the end of March 2011 and double the number of stores across the country in 
all formats within five years.  
6. Future Value Retail, a Future Group venture, will take its hypermarket chain Big Bazaar to 
smaller cities of Andhra Pradesh, with an investment of around US$ 1.54 million to US$ 4.41 
million depending on the size and format.  
7. RPG-owned Spencer's Retail plans to set up 15-20 new stores in the country in 2011-12.  
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8. Spar Hypermarkets, the global food retailing chain of the Dubai-based Landmark Group, expects 
to start funding its India expansion beyond 2013 out of its local cash flow in the country. So far, 
the Landmark Group has invested US$ 51.31 million in setting up five hypermarkets and plans to 
pump in another US$ 51.31 million into the next phase of expansion.  
9. Leading watchmaker Titan Industries Limited plans to invest about US$ 21.83 million for 
opening 50 premium watch outlets Helios in next five years to attain a sales target of US$ 87.31 
million.  
10. British high street retailer, Marks and Spencer (M&S) plans to significantly increase its retail 
presence in India, targeting 50 stores in the next three years.  
11. Spain's Inditex, Europe's largest clothing retailer opened the first store of its flagship Zara brand 
in India in June 2010. It further plans to open a total of five Zara outlets in India.  
12. Bharti Retail, owner of Easy Day store—supermarkets and hyper marts—plans to invest about 
US$ 2.5 billion over the next five years to add about 10 million sq ft of retail space in the country 
by then, according to a company spokesperson. 
 
Policy Initiatives 
 
100 per cent FDI is permitted under the automatic route for trading companies for cash & carry trading 
wholesale trading/ wholesale trading. FDI up to 51 per cent under the Government route is allowed in 
retail trade of Single Brand products, according to the Consolidated FDI Policy document. The Consumer 
Affairs Ministry has given the green signal to allow 49 per cent FDI in multi-brand retail. It has written a 
letter to this effect to the Commerce Ministry. "Multi-brand retail should be permitted with a cap of 49 per 
cent… A significant chunk of investments should be spent on back-end infrastructure, besides logistics 
and agro-processing," the Consumer Affairs Ministry had said in response to the discussion paper floated 
by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion in June 2010 on allowing 100 per cent FDI in multi-
brand retail. The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has notified the increase in the retail 
investment limit to US$ 4,391.19 in initial public offers (IPOs). The new norms will be applicable to issues 
that have yet not opened for subscription (Government of India 2010). 
 
Thus, major international brands are in the process of expanding their retail presence. For instance, Paul 
& Shark now has two stores with Hyderabad and will have few more by next year, Zegna, another Italian 
brand, known for its formal wear and quality suits, is also expanding and Diesel will have seven stores in 
the country. Meanwhile, European football clubs, including Manchester United, Chelsea and Liverpool, are 
increasingly scouting for partnerships in India to sell their merchandise and also set up chain of coffee 
clubs and theme shops. The stationery retailing market in India is also witnessing steady growth due to 
the arrival of organised players in the business. It is estimated that the Indian office products industry is 
in the range of US$ 2.22 billion with stationery comprising US$ 666.89 million-US$ 889.19 million and 
growing at 30 per cent per annum. Future Group and Reliance Retail are some of the players who are 
already tapping into the sector and have launched brands such as Staples and Office Depot.  
 
8. Research Discussion & Key Recommendations towards Attracting Diaspora FDI 
 
Allow 100 % FDI in retail and Small & Medium Enterprises (SME) 
 
FDI in SME’s is limited to only 24%, with any foreign investment above 24% being subject to industrial 
license with a mandatory export obligation of 50% of annual production and the manufacturer losing 
small scale status. Such restrictions are major impediments to FDI, and specifically Diaspora FDI. A large 
number of Indian entrepreneurs in the US, UK and other parts of the developed world are very successful 
retailers. Their expertise and capital are being prevented from being put to productive use in the Indian 
economy. A viable retail chain network often creates backward linkages with extremely positive effects 
on growth of efficient supply chain networks. Such networks in turn reduce cost to market and induce 
scale economies in several products that then become more competitive in the global market. 
 
A walk into any furniture, stationary, hardware or electronics store in the industrialized world, especially 
the US, will show that most of the items that have been reserved for the SME sector (a few examples of 
which are presented in Table 6), are imported from developing countries, especially from China. The 
Chinese and other Asian exporters of such products into industrialized markets became competitive 
precisely because of economies of scale, low transaction costs and the ability to invest in quality control 
and productivity without restrictions. As long as the policy of reservation for the small-scale sector 
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continues with its associated investment and scale of operation ceilings, Indian manufacturers will never 
be able to compete globally. As was pointed out, that does not mean just the loss of a potentially huge 
global opportunity; it will mean a gradual loss of the domestic market as well given that the forces of 
globalization will expose India to competition from China and other Asian countries.  
 
Table 6: Common Consumer and Industrial Use Products Reserved for SME 
1 Wooden furniture and fixtures 
2 Paper envelopes 
3 Teleprinter rolls 
4 Full PVC footwear (sandals and shoes) 
5 Polyethylene and PVC flexible hoses 
6 Graphite paints 
7 Industrial adhesives 
8 Formulated perfumery compounds 
9 Steel furniture and storage equipment 
10 Rolling shutters 
11 Stainless steel utensils 
12 Aluminum utensils 
13 Voltage stabilizers 
14 Electric irons 
15 Electric kettles 
16 Espresso coffee makers 
17 Bread toasters 
18 Electrical light fitting chokes 
19 Electrical light fittings starters 
20 Ball point pens 
 
Develop a Strategic Vision for FDI with focus on exports, technology, geographic specialization, 
and employment creation 
 
In comparison with the Chinese approach, the Indian FDI regime suffers because it is passive (open to all, 
without any targeting) and not strategic as in China (Kao, 1993). India's FDI policy should have 
prioritized investment in labor intensive manufacturing, for acquisition of technology and for the 
establishment of international trading channels to facilitate labor-intensive exports. The FDI policy 
environment also lacks a sense of sectoral and geographic specialization. Certain regions of India, though 
backward on the whole, possess competitive natural and human resources in certain specific sectors. The 
FDI requirement and its international marketing network for that sector need to be identified and global 
leaders in that sector actively wooed with this geographic-sectoral specialization in mind. Businesses 
respond best to specific proposals with the guarantee of an enabling mechanism, generalized talk of 
potential and good intentions will not attract serious investors. 
 
Reduction in Transaction Costs, Improvement of Infrastructure and Enabling Trade Facilitation 
 
More than any FDI policy, it is the level of business comfort and profitability of operation that attract FDI. 
India had a more liberal trade regime than either China or Malaysia but was not even close to attracting 
the kind of FDI that these economies attract. Transaction costs of operating a business in India remain 
prohibitive and infrastructure and logistical support poor. India’s export-import infrastructure including 
the soft infrastructure of information flows and administration of trade flows remain behind the 
standards set in other Asian economies such as Thailand, Malaysia and China. Transaction costs arising 
out of poor infrastructure, logistics and administration affect SME’s and other smaller players the most. 
As it was pointed out, the average diaspora investor is most likely to be small scale and such investors will 
feel the persistence of high transaction costs most acutely. Under such conditions, very few diaspora 
investors are likely to invest. In order to attract FDI, India first must become a competitive production 
base where people would want to invest. Implementation of Trade Facilitation reforms will lead to 
stronger trade linkages with ASEAN and other emerging markets in Asia, an imperative if India is to 
become a global production hub (prospect of which will attract FDI). 
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Similar Treatment to International and Domestic Entrepreneurship 
 
Capital and associated entrepreneurship is an important factor of production. The quality of 
entrepreneurship is the key for productive efficiency in an economy. To give preferential treatment to FDI 
over domestic capital and the associated entrepreneurial resources that go with it is to restrict this factor 
of production from contributing efficiently in the economy. The success of the Indian entrepreneur is now 
recognized globally, especially by global financial institutions that are the best arbiters of global firm level 
efficiency. India should have a holistic investment policy that creates an enabling mechanism for both 
India’s domestic as well as international investors and entrepreneurs, not single out preferential 
treatment for any one set of investors. Given India’s deep savings pool and ability to generate investable 
capital (the large sums that was raised for Tata’s takeover of Corus is a case to the point), this is of the 
essence. 
 
Decentralization of Administration Process 
 
A major reason behind China’s relative success in attracting FDI has been the relatively higher level of 
decentralization of the FDI policy and administration process. According to Kundra (2000), the Indian FDI 
policy process still remains highly centralized in Delhi and that is a major impediment in effective 
competition between states and efficacy in administration of FDI initiatives in many parts of India. While 
things have improved in terms of decentralization since Kundra’s analysis in 2000, the entire FDI policy 
environment still remains in centered around Delhi and not the state capitals where they should be given 
the diversity of India’s economic geography. 
 
Drastically Reduce Overly Bureaucratic FDI facilities 
 
India’s bureaucratic set-up maintains several investment and trade promotion bodies that work at cross 
purposes. There are too many ‘single’ windows and investment development commissions working at the 
same time. There is also a lack of policy consistency. For example, the Development India Initiative to 
showcase India as a manufacturing hub was discontinued without the initiative being allowed to reach a 
logical conclusion. There needs to be a real ‘single window’ that draws from the sectoral expertise of the 
different ministries, and more importantly the private sector. The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs can 
play this role for investment from the Indian diaspora and collaborate with the Department of Industrial 
Policy and Promotion, and the Foreign Investment Promotion Board that implement foreign investment 
policy.  
 
Private Public Partnership with Private Sector taking the lead 
 
Foreign investors are lured not by the proverbial persuasion of the bureaucracy or the politicians as they 
are by the broad policy framework, stability of the government and consistency in policy. Thus, having 
several government dominated investment commissions might not have any positive impact on FDI. 
Foreign investors are unlikely to be interested in holding talks with bureaucrats, ex-ministers or experts, 
however eminently qualified they might be. Foreign investors are more likely to respond to actual 
business plans and proposals from their business counterparts in India (Saxenian, 2000). Thus, the 
government should let the Indian private sector take the lead and provide the enabling mechanism. In 
this context, the formation of the Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre (OIFC) by the Government of India 
which is hosted by Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) is a step in the right direction. By letting CII be 
the host institution, the Government has effectively acknowledged that the private sector has to take the 
lead in this process. However, the OIFC has to become more than just a talk shop for it to play the role that 
has been assigned to it. More specifically the OIFC will have to nurtured and led by the top leadership in 
both the government and business because as Wei’s analysis point out, agencies that have established 
reporting mechanisms to the highest country’s policy makers (i.e., the president or prime minister) or to 
the private sector leadership (leading CEO’s etc) have been systematically more efficient at attracting FDI. 
 
Networking Overseas Indian Professionals placed in key Decision making positions 
 
A large part of the FDI in the IT and ITES sector was facilitated by Indians placed in key decision making 
position in Silicon Valley based giant companies. The off shoring of business processes (BPO) also saw 
many Indian professionals and managers in major MNC’s play an important role in mediating the 
movement of such investment into this industry in India. Thus, it is very important for FDI administrative 
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bodies in general and the OIFC in particular to focus on these groups by maintaining a detailed sector 
specific database of such highly placed Indians and make them a part of the process of by inviting to OIFC 
deliberations. It is also important to tap diaspora human resource to make Indian enterprise more 
globally competitive. In firm level perspective this would involve engaging with diaspora managerial, 
technical and business talent worldwide to work for Indian enterprise. In a more macro-level perspective 
this would involve tapping diaspora human and financial capita for the development of India’s domestic 
human resources and social sector. India’s diaspora include several prominent names in the academic 
field. India is very likely to face an acute shortage of skilled human resources as the economy grows. The 
Indian higher education system is in a poor state (with some exceptions like the IIT’s and IIM’s) and there 
is a great need for investment in this sphere. 
 
Creative Joint Ventures (JV) and Partnership to tap Diaspora entrepreneurship 
 
Continuing on the theme of JV’s, new and creative mechanisms need to be found to tap diaspora 
entrepreneurship for India. Joint Ventures and partnerships with Indian stakeholders provide the 
diaspora a firmer footing and surer way to deal with local risks. A few examples of the many ways by 
which diaspora entrepreneurship can invest and profit from the Indian market is given below: 
 
Marketing Joint Venture 
 
Establishing retail networks with the diaspora that source dedicatedly from Indian producers through a 
contractual agreement. Such an arrangement will work especially well in consumer goods, textiles and 
clothing. CII can contribute to the formation and the marketing through the Indian Brand Equity Fund 
(IBEF). 
 
Production Joint-Venture 
 
Actively encourage Indian corporate to strategically invest in venture capital funds that serve as a 
springboard for three way partnerships. The Indian corporate supported venture capital provides a part 
of the investment; another part is borne by an existing SME entrepreneur, while the third is borne by 
diaspora FDI. CII can have a dedicated investment wing that brings together the three groups. Such three 
way partnership can be used to augment existing production facilities, upgradation, or for new ventures.  
 
Diaspora-Small Entrepreneur Group Joint Ventures 
 
Identify successful small entrepreneurs operating in clusters, or in the same sector/production line in 
different geographies of India. Help consolidation and corporatization with the help of diaspora 
investment by selling the investment opportunity to interested diaspora members. 
 
Policies to Convert Remittances into Investment and Create Venture Capital 
 
India is the highest recipient of remittances in the world. India received just fewer than 25 billion USD 
worth of remittances in 2005, more than 3 times the amount of FDI for the same year (6.6 billion USD). 
Indians also invest heavily in India’s bonds and funds market. The outstanding NRI deposits to be 32 
billion USD in 2005. If such remittances and investable funds are properly harnessed, it can generate vast 
amounts of capital to finance India’s industrial expansion just like FDI. Remittances can often play a 
significant role in providing working capital. Accumulation of capital from remittances might not 
necessarily show up as investment in enterprise defined by the formal sector, though such a phenomenon 
is not uncommon. The more substantive impact of remittances is likely to be felt through the easing of 
credit constraints in relatively poorer households that enable incremental investment in the more 
productive use of existing economic resources (Mahambare, 2001). 
 
For example, remittances might allow credit constrained households to invest in better technology for 
agriculture or expand informal retail businesses. Return migrants can use their savings to invest in SME 
upon their return to their country of origin. Such entrepreneurial activity can be better organized if there 
was a policy environment that helped sustain it. Many countries such as Philippines and Mexico now 
actively help return migrants with investment advice and facilitation to enable productive investment of 
their savings from abroad. The investment of such savings is effectively a form of ‘FDI’. In India’s case, 
such remittance oriented FDI is pretty common in regions like Gujarat and Punjab where family networks 
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draw capital from their members working abroad to finance their enterprise. Thus, the policy 
environment on FDI needs to take a broader view on the concept of foreign capital being invested in 
Indian enterprise and pay more attention to such SME activity being financed by diaspora networks. More 
importantly, diaspora networks could be organized into investment co-operatives that work with 
diaspora centric venture capital firms so small remittances can be channeled into bigger investment 
projects. The IT and ITES sector has seen the rise of Indian venture capital firms that work with the 
diaspora to channel their savings into Indian start-ups. It is time to create a policy environment and take 
initiatives to do the same for the manufacturing sector SME.  
 
9. Conclusion and Future Research 
 
Amidst today’s time of fierce competition and a quest to achieve and enhance a substantial level of 
economic and social development; each and every nation is trying to liberalize its economic policies in 
order to attract investments from not only, domestic players, but also from magnates all across the globe. 
Consequently, people with generous reserves of funds, all around the globe, are expanding their wings 
and seeking opportunities for investing in different spheres of this lucrative market. India too is not 
oblivious to the rapid developments taking place in the global market and has emerged as one of the 
prime destinations for the investment of funds from an impressive number of foreign investors. FDI is a 
superb conduit for the transfer of technology and know-how to developing countries. This message has 
not been lost on India's policy makers. They have though until the decade of the nineties attempted to 
regulate and control its spheres of activity and the contractual forms of foreign enterprise participation in 
the economy. The framework of policies they put in place was guided by the desire to limit foreign control 
of economic activity but at the same time take advantage of the technology and know how provided by 
foreign capital. This attempt at riding two horses in tandem, a complex feat, inevitably resulted in a 
complex and cumbersome bureaucratically guided FDI regime and earned India the reputation for 
hostility towards FDI. 
 
Even so, there are those who argue that a lot more needs to be done and India should throw all doors 
wide open to FDI. The spectacular growth of FDI in China is frequently invoked in support of this 
passionate advocacy of FDI. This paper has argued that this exuberance for FDI should be tempered by 
the recognition that FDI is a superb catalyst of growth and not an initiator, its efficacy in promoting 
development objectives is conditioned by the presence of co-operant factors in the host economies and it 
is most effective in countries which possess a threshold level of human capital. There is no reason to 
believe that inflows of large volumes of FDI alone necessarily promote the growth of the social product. 
The optimum level of FDI a country should aspire for is conditioned by the history and the stage of its 
industrialisation, the sources of FDI it has ease of access to and its endowments of co-operant factors and 
the sort of institutions it possess, facilitate and monitor the operations of foreign firms. For these reasons 
the thesis that India should regard China as a role model may be misconceived. The paper also suggests 
that India may now be better placed than in the past to effectively utilise licensing and technical 
collaboration agreements as opposed to FDI.  
 
Apart from taking steps to improve infrastructural facilities and enhancing labor market flexibility, the 
highlights of ten further policy recommendations for India’s FDI strategy is discussed for policymakers 
going forward and the future research should be done on these ten areas to brighten the Foreign Direct 
Investment towards India. 
 
1. One, while the government has lifted sectoral caps for FDI over the last decade, policies have thus 
far been piecemeal and ad-hoc and a source of uncertainty. Particular attention should also be 
paid to the removal of restrictions on FDI in the services sectors -- including telecoms, banking 
and insurance, aviation, etc – as this will help easy transactions costs for both consumers and 
business. 
2. Two, as a means of trying to overcome some of the hindrances to large-scale investments in the 
manufacturing sector. It is often noted that such a strategy was successfully undertaken by China 
and used effectively by the government in policy experimentation before being replicated on a 
larger scale. 
3. Three, focus should not just be on the absolute amount of gross FDI inflows but also the type. 
More specifically, while India has experienced an infusion of FDI inflows in recent times, a large 
portion of the new inflows have been in the form of M&As. 
152 
 
4. Four, over and above the creation of a business-friendly environment, it may be important for a 
potential host country to actively undertake investment-promotion policies to fill in information 
gaps or correct perception gaps that may hinder FDI inflows. 
5. Five, while India must do image-building exercises to promote it as a favourable investment 
location; it desperately needs to get rid of the tag that it can only do services and not 
manufacturing. Between India and China, ask any businessman about where they will invest their 
money: if it is service sector related, the answer, more often than not, is India and when it is 
manufacturing sector related, the answer is mostly always China. 
6. Six, is the desperate need to create a deep talent pool. Again an activity that is easier said than 
done because it takes time to create a deep talent pool. If one looks at investment bank reports 
on India, one point that gets constantly highlighted is the lack of talent at all levels. This is 
inherently dangerous for a country like India which has a tag of a services country; a sector that 
needs a deep talent pool to feed off. This lack of talent is reflected in the growth in wages which is 
one of the highest in the world. 
7. Seven, the Government continues to advocate a policy of targeted promotion, suggesting it has 
potentially high payoffs, though also acknowledging that it can be a risky proposition. It finds 
support from the successes of countries like Singapore whose investment promotion authority, 
the Economic Development Board (EDB), has quite successfully targeted specific global 
corporations to meet their specific locational requirements, or broad sectors to invest in the city 
state.  
8. Eight, while many policy barriers have been removed on FDI in India, results have at times been 
disappointing due to administrative barriers at the state level as well as lack of coordination 
between the central and state governments. There need to be greater coordination between the 
centre and states to ensure that the substantial foreign interest in investing in India gets 
translated into actual investment flows to the state. 
9. Nine, India should continue to work towards developing a deep and liquid corporate debt market. 
India is one of the few countries with a major equity market but with a highly illiquid corporate 
debt market. A well functioning corporate debt market does one major thing for companies 
looking to invest in India. It is very likely that when companies are investing their money in India 
or in any other country, they are more likely to use debt rather than their own cash. Therefore, 
they would go to debt markets in their countries of origin and raise money there. 
10. Ten, India should consciously work towards attracting greater FDI into R&D as a means of 
strengthening the country’s technological prowess and competitiveness. If India is to do so, there 
needs to be a strengthening in intellectual property rights or IPRs. 
So, 
Invest in India…. 
Let the FDI inflows into India… 
Let India lead the global market… 
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